Transitivity judgments, memory for premises, and models of children's reasoning by Chapman, M. & Lindenberger, U.
DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 12, 124-163 (1992) 
Transitivity Judgments, Memory for Premises, and 
Models of Children’s Reasoning 
MICHAELCHAPMAN? 
University of British Columbia 
AND 
ULMAN LINDENBERGER 
Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education 
A distributional model of the relation between judgments on transitivity tasks 
and memory for premise comparisons is proposed, according to which a total 
population of children solving a transitivity task can be divided into two subpop- 
ulations: (a) The operational subpopulation consists of all children who infer their 
transitivity judgments (e.g., stick A is longer than stick C) from a composition of 
premise relations (A is longer than B and B is longer than C); (b) the nonopera- 
tional subpopulation consists of all children who infer their transitivity judgments 
in some other way. In the operational subpopulation, memory for premises should 
be accurate (because operational composition of premise comparisons depends on 
the retention of those premises), and transitivity judgments should be correct 
(because operational composition leads to a correct judgment “by necessity”). In 
the nonoperational subpopulation, memory for premises should be stochastically 
independent of transitivity judgments. The assumptions of this distributional 
model are tested against data on transitive reasoning in 120 first, second, and third 
graders and found to be reasonable. From the distributional model, an equation is 
derived allowing the researcher to compute the minimum proportion of opera- 
tional reasoners required to reject the null hypothesis of independence between 
judgments and memory in a sample drawn from a mixed (nonoperational + op- 
erational) population. Reports of reasoning-remembering independence in pre- 
vious studies are reinterpreted in light of the present findings. 0 1992 Academic 
Press, Inc. 
Ever since the Greeks defined humankind as “the rational animal,” the 
capacity for reasoning has been esteemed as a distinctive feature of hu- 
man intelligence. In its broadest sense, “reasoning” refers to the explicit 
consideration of the reasons that can be adduced for believing, doing, or 
valuing one thing over another (Rescher, 1988). As such, it serves the 
related functions of decision making and ofjustifying the decisions which 
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are made, whether these functions are performed verbally and collec- 
tively or mentally, in the minds of individuals. 
In contrast, the psychological investigation of human reasoning gener- 
ally has been limited to a subset of such functions. For example, Wason 
and Johnson-Laird (1972) defined the subject of their book as follows: 
“Our concern is simply this: given a set of assertions, to what extent can 
the individual appreciate all that follows from them by virtue of logic 
alone, and remain unseduced by plausible, but fallacious conclusions?” 
(pp. l-2). Three implications of this definition are worth noting: (a) The 
focus is on the intrapsychic cognitive processes of individuals; (b) the 
processes of interest are typically deductive-those which follow from a 
given set of premises to the conclusion(s) which follow from those pre- 
mises; (c) the question of interest is whether and to what extent the 
deductive reasoning of real human beings is governed by logically valid 
principles, as opposed to extralogical factors. 
Answering this question has been problematic (see Cohen, 1981, and 
the accompanying commentaries). A major difficulty is the fact that hu- 
man subjects do not necessarily have veridical insight into their own 
cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This difficulty has been 
especially acute in developmental studies of human reasoning. Presum- 
ably, children are less skilled both in introspection and in the verbal 
expression of their thoughts than are adults. For these reasons, investi- 
gators have attempted to infer the character of children’s cognitive pro- 
cesses through a variety of indirect, nonverbal methods (Braine, 1959; 
Brainerd, 1973; Siegel, 1978). However, the use of such methods has been 
questioned on the grounds that they might not measure what they were 
intended to measure originally (Larsen, 1977; Miller, 1976). 
This article is devoted to a consideration of one such method for in- 
vestigating the cognitive processes used by children in common reasoning 
tasks presumed to require deductive inference. The method is based on an 
inherent feature of deductive reasoning: In order to make valid inferences 
from a set of premises, reasoners must at a minimum keep those premises 
in mind. Further, this theoretical dependence of deductive reasoning on 
an awareness of the required premises should translate in practice into a 
sfutisficul dependence between the conclusion that is presumably derived 
from a given set of premises and memory for the premises in question; the 
conclusion should be drawn with greater frequency, if memory for the 
required premises can be demonstrated (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, 1985). 
First, the relevant research on reasoning and memory is reviewed, and 
the conditions favoring reasoning-remembering dependencies are speci- 
fied. Next, a distributional model is described which enables the re- 
searcher to specify the conditions under which the theoretical depen- 
dence between reasoning and memory for premises should result in a 
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statistical dependence between the stated conclusions and observed 
memory for premises. Finally, the implications of the model for the in- 
terpretation of previous studies as well as for theories of reasoning more 
generally are discussed. 
REASONING AND MEMORY 
Starting with Piaget’s (19230955, 1924/1928) earliest works, most re- 
search on the development of reasoning has been focused on children’s 
increasing grasp of valid forms of inference. Only later did researchers 
begin to study the retention of relevant background knowledge as a pos- 
sible limitation on children’s reasoning (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Roodin 
& Gruen, 1970). The argument was that young children might fail to draw 
transitive inferences, not because they failed to grasp the forms of rea- 
soning involved, but because they tended to forget the relevant back- 
ground information before they could draw the appropriate conclusion. In 
order to test that hypothesis, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) trained young 
children to criterion on memory for the premises of a transitive inference 
before giving them the transitivity task and found that children as young 
as 4 years of age could solve transitivity problems that typically are not 
solved until 7 to 8 years of age with Piagetian procedures. This finding 
appeared to support the conclusion that young children failed the stan- 
dard procedures because of a memory deficit, not because of any lack of 
logical reasoning abilities. 
That conclusion was controversial from the start. Early criticism cen- 
tered around the possibility that the transitivity task used by Bryant and 
Trabasso could be solved by nontransitive forms of reasoning, including 
perceptual generalization (Youniss & Furth, 1973), “sequential- 
contiguous” seriation (Breslow, 1981), and labelling (De Broysson- 
Bardies & O’Regan, 1973; Kallio, 1982; Perner & Aebi, 1985). In reply, 
Trabasso (1975, 1977) argued that the important question was how chil- 
dren solve transitivity tasks in any case, whether or not their thinking is 
labelled “true” transitive reasoning. In his view, the results of a number 
of studies using the Bryant-Trabasso procedures demonstrated that chil- 
dren solve transitivity problems by representing comparison objects in a 
linear series with spatial properties such that any two members of the 
series could be compared directly; even if transitive inference were not 
required in the test phase of the experiment, the integration of premise 
comparisons into a linear series with transitive properties was indicative 
of some understanding of transitivity (see also Halford & Kelly, 1984). 
Subsequent research has suggested, however, that such integration of 
premises occurs only under specific task conditions, when salient infor- 
mation regarding serial order (Kallio, 1982), graduation of relevant dimen- 
sions (Perner & Aebi, 1985), or spatial relations (Chapman & Linden- 
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berger, 1988) is provided. Therefore, Trabasso’s model cannot be con- 
sidered an explanation of transitive reasoning in general, but only of 
successful performance on transitivity tasks under specific task condi- 
tions . 
Another line of criticism centered around the statistical relation be- 
tween children’s memory for premises and their judgments on transitive 
reasoning tasks. Both Halford and Galloway (1977) and Russell (1981) 
found that some children did not draw transitive inferences even though 
they recalled the necessary premises, suggesting that failure could not be 
explained by memory deficits alone. A more radical conclusion was 
drawn by Brainerd and Kingma (1984), who found that memory for prem- 
ises and transitivity judgments were stochastically independent, both in 
their own studies of transitivity and in reanalyses of Halford and Gallo- 
way’s (1977) and Russell’s (1981) data. Whereas most Piagetian and in- 
formation processing models presuppose a dependency between reason- 
ing and memory, Brainerd and Kingma proposed a “fuzzy trace” model 
of reasoning, according to which children solved transitivity tasks with 
informationally impoverished memory traces of the form, “Things get 
bigger toward the right,” rather than with the “precise” premise repre- 
sentations (“A is longer than B,” and so on) previously assumed. In 
another study (Brainerd & Kingma, 1985), they extended this method to 
other reasoning tasks, including class inclusion, conservation, and prob- 
ability judgment, as well as transitivity. In each case, children’s judg- 
ments were found to be stochastically independent of their memory for 
premises. These results were explained in terms of a functional indepen- 
dence between short-term memory and information processing. Whereas 
memory for premise information involves precise “verbatim” memory 
traces, human information processing is adapted to the use of imprecise, 
gist-like “fuzzy traces.” Precise premise information is by-passed in rea- 
soning whenever such fuzzy traces are sufficient for inferring correct 
judgments. 
The novelty of Brainerd and Kingma’s argument derives in part from its 
counterintuitive character. An informal survey of developmental re- 
searchers found that 71% believed that memory for the adjacent terms in 
an A > B > C transitivity problem should be strongly or moderately 
correlated with transitivity judgments (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, pp. 
3 12n-313n). However, the argument for independence of transitivity judg- 
ments and memory for premises would be less counterintuitive if children 
were able to infer correct judgments without the use of transitive reason- 
ing based on adjacent comparisons. No relation between correct judg- 
ments and memory for a given set of premises should be found if children 
can and do infer a correct judgment from an entirely different set of 
premises. In a comparison between two commonly used versions of the 
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transitive reasoning task, for example, Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) 
found that one version (the “alternate” version) could be solved through 
the use of spatial position cues, because the relevant physical dimension 
was correlated with spatial position (e.g., comparison objects were ar- 
ranged from right to left in order of increasing length). The other version 
(the “standard” version) could not be solved in the same way, because 
the relevant dimension was uncorrelated with position. Significantly, the 
“alternate” version was modelled on the task used by Brainerd and 
Kingma (1984, 1985) for testing the dependency between memory and 
reasoning. According to Chapman and Lindenberger (1988), one would 
not expect any reasoning-remembering dependency for that version in 
any case, because it can be solved without recourse to the set of premises 
(“A is longer than B, ” “B is longer than C”) for which memory was 
tested (see also Chapman, 1989). 
In reply, Reyna and Brainerd (1989) argued that, even if the Brainerd 
and Kingma (1984) results could be explained in that way, Chapman and 
Lindenberger’s explanation did not cover all cases; independence be- 
tween reasoning and remembering had also been found by Halford and 
Galloway (1977) and by Russell (1981), using tasks that did not resemble 
the “alternate” task used by Chapman and Lindenberger. Additional 
counterarguments were presented by Reyna and Brainerd (1990). The 




Both Brainerd and Kingma (1984) and Chapman and Lindenberger 
(1988) agreed that reasoning-remembering dependencies should be found 
under some conditions. According to Brainerd and Kingma, such depen- 
dencies should be found when retention of the explicit background facts 
is a “logical precondition for correct reasoning” (1984, p. 364).’ Similarly, 
Chapman and Lindenberger argued that reasoning should be related to 
memory for premises only when subjects actually use a form of reasoning 
that utilizes the particular premises in question. Therefore, the relevant 
question is not so much whether or not reasoning is dependent on mem- 
ory, but under what conditions subjects are likely to use the form of 
i Recently, Brainerd and Reyna (1990) have provided a more explicit description of the 
conditions under which reasoning-remembering dependencies should occur according to 
fuzzy trace theory. Briefly, such dependencies should be found when memory probes can be 
answered through reconstructive processing based on the same “fuzzy traces” used in 
solving reasoning problems. This prediction is discussed in a later section of this paper. For 
present purposes, the question of interest is what happens when the conditions described by 
Brainerd and Reyna are nor met. 
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reasoning in question. A dependence between the premises and conclu- 
sion of that form of reasoning would be expected only under those con- 
ditions . 
With respect to transitive reasoning, one would expect children’s judg- 
ments regarding nonadjacent length or weight comparisons (e.g., A > C) 
to be dependent on memory for adjacent “premise” comparisons (A > B 
and B > C) only if the children are, in fact, using a form of reasoning in 
which the conclusion A > C is derived from the stated premises. If, 
instead, children infer length or weight from right-left spatial orientation 
or from some other dimension that happens to be correlated with length 
or weight, then no dependency between adjacent and nonadjacent com- 
parisons would be expected. At most, a dependency between judgments 
and knowledge of the respective correlation between dimensions might be 
expected. 
The main significance of the Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) study 
for present purposes involves the demonstration that the form of reason- 
ing actually used by children in transitivity tasks depends on specific task 
conditions. Functional reasoning-inferring length or weight as a func- 
tion of some other dimension, in this case right-left spatial orientation- 
should be possible only if length or weight is in fact correlated with spatial 
orientation (e.g., if the comparison objects are lined up from right to left 
in front of the child in order of increasing/decreasing length or weight). 
Under such conditions, children would be expected to infer the nonadja- 
cent comparisons from the spatial correlations rather than from the adja- 
cent comparisons, because the former form of reasoning involves signif- 
icantly less mental effort than the latter (Chapman, 1987a). If such extra- 
neous correlations do not exist then a consideration of individual premise 
comparisons should be necessary. Following this line of reasoning, de- 
pendence between adjacent and nonadjacent comparisons would be ex- 
pected only when the extraneous correlations necessary for functional 
reasoning have been eliminated. 
Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) cited three sources of evidence for 
their conclusion that children used different forms of reasoning depending 
on whether the relevant dimension in a transitivity task was objectively 
correlated with right-left spatial orientation (their “alternate” condition) 
or uncorrelated with spatial orientation (their “standard” condition): (a) 
Children justified correct answers differently under the two conditions, 
giving functional justifications (e.g., “object A is longer than object C, 
because A is on the right”) in the “alternate” condition and operational 
justifications (“A is longer than C, because A is longer than B and B is 
longer than C”) in the “standard” condition; (b) the task was consider- 
ably easier and solved by children at younger ages in the “alternate” 
condition than in the “standard” control condition; (c) the number of 
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premise comparisons affected performance only in the “standard,” and 
not in the “alternate” condition. Chapman and Lindenberger argued that 
these findings provided converging evidence for the hypothesis that chil- 
dren inferred their judgments as a function of spatial orientation in the 
“alternate” condition and through a composition of premise relations in 
the “standard” condition-in other words, that they tended to use the 
same forms of reasoning in inferring their judgments as in constructing 
their justifications across conditions. In this view, the number of premise 
comparisons affected performance in the “standard” but not in the 
“alternate” condition, because children had to represent the premise 
comparisons separately in the first, but not in the second. 
Those conclusions were challenged by Reyna and Brainerd (1990), who 
argued that children indisputably can be “in full command of transitivity” 
without being able to articulate their understanding (cf. Brainerd, 1973, 
1977). For this reason, verbal explanations are highly fallible measures of 
“logical competence,” and the claim that justifications are interesting in 
their own right (Chapman, 1991) has no bearing on the issue. Besides 
imposing “an additional performance burden” verbal justifications have 
no particular advantage over patterns of judgments in assessing the qual- 
itative characteristics of children’s thinking (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). 
Similarly, Reyna and Brainerd questioned whether differential effects 
of increasing memory load have any relevance for the assessment of 
competence in reasoning. Memory limitations could constrain reasoning 
performance in some tasks but not others, depending on whether subjects 
are able “to access an external store that harbors verbatim information 
about individual items.” In their view, children’s use of an external array 
for solving transitivity problems does not imply that they are not compe- 
tent in transitivity any more than the use of a scratch pad for solving 
addition problems implies that the persons in question cannot add. In 
either case, increasing the memory load of problems to be solved will 
have less of an effect when the external aid is provided than when it is not, 
but such a result does not have any particular implications for determining 
what competencies are involved (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). 
PRO AND CONTRA 
We believe that Reyna and Brainerd’s (1990) arguments are flawed. To 
begin with the issue of children’s verbal justifications as assessment cri- 
teria, we do not wish to claim that such justifications make good measures 
of “logical competence” after all. Instead, we want to distinguish two 
different kinds of competencies: competence in intrapsychic inference by 
the individual and competence in the justification of one’s statements to 
an interlocutor. Once those competencies are distinguished, one 
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can ask how they are related. If, as Piaget (192411928) once believed, 
intrapsychic inference develops from interpersonal argumentation and 
justification, then good theoretical reasons exist for expecting a close 
empirical relation between the two. In order to test this proposition, 
intrapsychic inference must be assessed independently from verbal justi- 
fication. A major purpose of the present article is to examine one possible 
method for doing so: testing the relation between memory for premises 
and correctness of judgments on a transitive reasoning task. 
Similarly, we cannot agree with Reyna and Brainerd that differential 
effects of increasing numbers of premises are irrelevant for identifying 
competence in reasoning. If different forms of reasoning are predicted to 
occur under different task conditions and to be differentially affected by 
increasing numbers of premises, and if such a pattern of results is actually 
observed, then those results provide evidence for the hypothesis in ques- 
tion according to any version of the logic of hypothesis testing. In Pop- 
perian terms, the hypothesis has survived a test of falsification. Thus, 
Chapman and Lindenberger’s (1988) finding that increasing numbers of 
premises affected reasoning in their “standard” condition but not in their 
“alternate” condition provides evidence for the hypothesis by which 
those results were predicted (that premise comparisons were represented 
separately in the one condition but not the other). Against Reyna and 
Brainerd’s analogy between children’s use of an external array in the 
transitivity task and the use of a scratch pad for adding a series of num- 
bers, we would argue that the external array condition is more like pro- 
viding people with sets of objects corresponding to the numbers to be 
added so that they can obtain the correct sum without adding the numbers 
at all, but by counting all the individual objects instead. As argued in the 
case of transitivity tasks featuring an external array, the external aid 
lessens the memory load of the task by providing subjects with a quali- 
tatively different procedure for obtaining a correct solution. 
As this example suggests, Reyna and Brainerd’s line of argument rests 
on the claim that children use a genuine form of transitive inference when 
provided with an external array as in the Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 
1985) studies or in Chapman and Lindenberger’s (1988) “alternate” con- 
dition. If such were not the case, then Brainerd and Kingma’s findings of 
reasoning-remembering independence would have no bearing on transi- 
tive reasoning as such. Accordingly, Reyna and Brainerd (1990) offered 
three arguments to the effect that children’s reasoning is genuinely 
“logical,” even when they are provided with an external array. 
The first argument was based on a norm-referenced approach: Al- 
though children’s absolute levels of performance increase with age, the 
pattern of results (reasoning-remembering independence and lack of 
memory constraints) found by Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985) did not 
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differ by age; thus, the evidence suggests that young children solve tran- 
sitivity problems in qualitatively the same way as adults. Because adults 
are generally considered to be competent in transitive reasoning, young 
children also must be competent in such reasoning, and their lower levels 
of performance are likely to result from performance deficits rather than 
from any lack of competence. However, as Reyna and Brainerd admitted 
a few paragraphs further on, this argument is not decisive because adults 
themselves do not always think “logically.” The question is whether 
either children or adults use genuine transitive reasoning when provided 
with an external array-or whether that array allows them to use a sim- 
pler and qualitatively different form of reasoning. In order to answer this 
question, some independent criteria for “genuine” transitive reasoning 
are necessary. 
Accordingly, Reyna and Brainerd advanced a second line of argument 
in which Brainerd and Kingma’s findings were viewed in relation to the 
Piagetian concrete-operational criterion of transitive reasoning as the re- 
versible coordination of ordinal relations around a common term. In brief, 
Reyna and Brainerd argued that (a) two preoperational strategies previ- 
ously proposed as explanations for young children’s high performance on 
some versions of the transitivity problem-categorical labelling and se- 
quential-contiguous ordering (Breslow, 198l)-cannot account for Brain- 
erd and Kingma’s (1984, 1985) results, and therefore (b) the reasoning of 
children observed in those studies must satisfy the Piagetian reversibility 
criterion. Curiously, Reyna and Brainerd did not consider the preopera- 
tional “functional reasoning” proposed by Chapman and Lindenberger 
(1988) as a model of the form of inference that children bring to bear on 
the transitivity problem when provided with an external array. As previ- 
ously described, this model can account for Brainerd and Kingma’s (1984, 
1985) results without assuming that children have any representation of an 
ordered scale based on pairwise relations at all. When children are shown 
the adjacent terms in an ordered external array, they simply note that the 
longer of the two is always on the right (or left, as the case may be). 
Armed with this empirical generalization, they can infer the relation of 
length between any two terms in the array as a function of the right-left 
spatial relation between the same two terms. They never have to consider 
more than two terms at a time, and that is why such reasoning does not 
require any comprehension of an ordered series based on the coordination 
of pairwise comparisons around a common term. Because Reyna and 
Brainerd have not ruled out this preoperational model of performance in 
the external array condition, they cannot claim by default that children’s 
reasoning satisfies the Piagetian criterion for transitivity under such con- 
ditions. 
The third argument of Reyna and Brainerd was based on a procedural 
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criterion: If children possess a cognitive representation capable of gener- 
ating correct answers when they are presented with the premises of a 
transitive inference, then the system can be judged to be “logical” (i.e., 
a genuine form of transitive reasoning). But that argument fares no better 
than the first two. For if the premises presented to subjects can be rep- 
resented by them in different ways, and if the objective situation is such 
that both kinds of representations can result in correct judgments, then 
the coincidence of the particular premises as input and correct judgments 
as output provides no evidence for any particular intervening form of 
reasoning. 
In short, none of Reyna and Brainerd’s arguments succeeds in demon- 
strating that children provided with an external array infer their answers 
through transitive reasoning understood as the coordination of pair-wise 
comparisons around a common term. However, Trabasso’s (1975, 1977) 
argument is still available to them: Perhaps the important issue is not 
whether children or adults solve transitivity problems through some ide- 
alized criterion for “true” transitive reasoning, but how they actually 
solve the problems in any case. That position would allow Reyna and 
Brainerd to maintain the claim that fuzzy trace theory is a general theory 
of reasoning without saddling themselves with the heavy burden of dem- 
onstrating that the forms of reasoning specified in that theory are genuine 
transitive inferences as commonly understood. Against this claim of gen- 
erality stands Chapman and Lindenberger’s (1988) finding that children 
really do make transitive inferences based on individual premise compar- 
isons under some conditions-indeed, that the form of reasoning de- 
scribed in fuzzy trace theory occurs only under very special conditions. 
But as Reyna and Brainerd (1990) pointed out, Chapman and Lindenberg- 
er’s conclusions are based on the disputed assumption that children in 
their “standard” condition inferred their judgments in a manner roughly 
consistent with their verbal justifications. Perhaps, instead, they inferred 
their judgments as described in fuzzy trace theory and justified them only 
after the fact with reference to individual premise comparisons. 
The major goal of this study was to provide additional tests of the 
hypothesis that children infer transitive judgments through a composition 
of individual comparsions when the relevant physical dimension is uncor- 
related with spatial orientation. The method used is that pioneered by 
Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985), who found that transitivity judgments 
and memory for premises were stochastically independent when children 
were tested under the external array condition. The question addressed in 
this study is whether such independence between reasoning and remem- 
bering is found when children are not provided with such an external 
array-that is, under Chapman and Lindenberger’s “standard” condi- 
tion. 
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Another important question is under what conditions reasoning- 
remembering dependencies, if they do exist, would be detected by the 
researcher. Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985) give two major reasons 
why the absence of such a dependency in their analyses is unlikely to 
have resulted from a lack of statistical power: (a) The data entering into 
each statistical test were based upon a large number of protocols, so their 
null findings should not have resulted from false negative measurement 
error. (b) The fact that a reasoning-remembering dependence was found 
for SOme tasks (including numerical invariance, mental arithmetic, and 
conservation) in which precise premise information presumably was re- 
quired for correct reasoning, argues against the possibility that the anal- 
yses were incapable of detecting reasoning-remembering dependencies in 
principle. Evaluation of those claims necessitates some consideration of 
theform that reasoning-remembering dependencies is likely to take when 
it does occur. In the next section, this problem is addressed in the context 
of Piaget’s theory of concrete operations2 
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND A DISTRIBUTIONAL MODEL 
According to Piaget (1947/1950, 1949/1972a), concrete operational rea- 
soning is “operational” in two senses: (a) the task information is assim- 
ilated by the subject through first-order “operations” originating from 
interiorized actions; and (b) inferences beyond the information given are 
drawn by means of a second-order operation which acts by “composing” 
two or more of those first-order operations. In the transitivity of length 
task, the first-order operations are the interiorized actions involved in 
comparing the lengths of A and B and those of B and C, and the second- 
order operation is the composifion of those two comparisons. From the 
composition of the AB and BC comparisons, the AC comparison can be 
2 Our references to Piaget’s theory of concrete operations do not imply that we accept the 
traditional interpretation of his structural stage theory, according to which children are 
expected to reason consistently across tasks and domains within a given developmental 
stage. The argument is twofold: (a) Piaget himself did not believe in such consistency and the 
traditional interpretation as stated above arose in the assimilation of Piaget’s theory into 
mainstream developmental psychology (Chapman, 1987a, 1988), and more importantly, (b) 
one must acknowledge the context dependency of children’s forms of reasoning, quite apart 
from what Piaget may or may not have believed. The fact that children are capable of a 
higher-level form of reasoning does not mean they will use it under all circumstances what- 
ever. For reasons of cognitive economy, one might expect them to continue using the 
lower-level form of reasoning in situations in which it is sufficient for the task at hand. For 
example, inferring weight from size is quite sufftcient in a situation in which the objects 
involved are in fact of equal density. The developmental problem for children is to recognize 
when a lower-level form of reasoning is not appropriate and to develop a higher-level form 
which is. 
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generated. So defined, operational reasoning can be used for either pur- 
poses of deductive inference or justification, depending on whether the 
primary movement is from the premises to the conclusion (“A > B and B 
> C, so A > C”) or from the conclusion to the premises which justify it 
(“A > C, because A > B and B > C”), respectively. One might expect 
operational competence in justification to be related in some degree to 
operational competence in intrapsychic inference because both have ei- 
ther the same form or, according to some theories of sociogenesis, the 
second might develop from the first (Chapman, 1991, in press). 
Another relevant characteristic of operational reasoning is the “logical 
necessity” associated with it. Piaget frequently wrote that concrete op- 
erational thinking was characterized by a “sense of necessity” (e.g., 
Piaget, 1971). Evidence that both children and adults do associate con- 
crete-operational reasoning with some form of logical necessity has been 
reported by Miller (1986). However, one would be mistaken to equate the 
sense of necessity characteristic of concrete operations with “formal” or 
“analytic” necessity-i.e., with the requirement that the meaning of a 
conclusion is already contained in the premises. The fact that concrete 
operational reasoning involves some empirical content has often been 
noted (e.g., Brainerd, 1973; Hall & Kaye, 1978), but this does not imply 
that such reasoning does not also involve necessity, only that necessity is 
less than analytic in character. 
Piaget’s solution to this problem was to ascribe a weaker sense of 
necessity to concrete operations than the formal, analytic necessity char- 
acteristic of formal operations. In his posthumously published book on 
the development of necessity (Piaget, 1983/1987a), he pointed out that the 
sense of necessity which develops at the stage of concrete operations has 
a modal character: The truth of an assertion is necessary, if its negation 
is impossible (see also Piaget, 19770986). Because the range of possibil- 
ities considered by concrete operational thinkers is primarily empirical 
(Piaget, 1981/1987b), there is a corresponding sense of necessity that de- 
pends upon knowledge of what is empirically possible and impossible. 
Anyone with an empirical knowledge of length as a physical dimension 
will recognize that C cannot be longer than A, if A is longer than B and 
B is longer than C. Therefore, A must be longer than C. 
The origin of concrete operational necessity is a question to which we 
return later. For present purposes, the important point is the following: 
The element of necessity in concrete operational reasoning guarantees 
that certain “premise” information will uniquely determine the resulting 
judgment. In terms of transitive reasoning, these considerations imply 
that a reasoner who is provided with accurate information that A is longer 
than B and B is longer than C and who, in fact, uses an operational form 
of inference will always return the judgment that A is longer than C. In 
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theory, accurate premise information together with operational inference 
should always lead to correct judgments; in practice, some instances of 
misunderstanding, faulty inference or misspeaking, are likely to occur 
with some small probability. A similar argument was made by Scribner 
(1977) for syllogistic reasoning: If subjects infer their judgments from a 
deductive composition of premises, then those judgments should invari- 
ably be correct, except for a small proportion of errors of comprehension 
and production just mentioned. Consistent with this hypothesis, she 
found that, across seven studies of syllogistic reasoning conducted in 
Mexico and Africa, the proportion of theoretical reasons associated with 
wrong answers averaged about 1%. Of 600 problems in the African study, 
not a single case was found in which a subject giving a deductive justiti- 
cation had a wrong answer. A low incidence of children giving incorrect 
judgments and deductive justifications in a transitivity task was reported 
by Russell (1981). 
To summarize the argument for transitivity: if “operational reasoning” 
is defined as reasoning based on a composition of premise relations, then 
children inferring their transitivity judgments operationally should (a) 
have accurate memory for premises (otherwise, they would not be able to 
make operational inferences) and (b) exhibit correct judgments (because 
operational inference, given accurate premise information, “necessarily” 
leads to a correct judgment). More generally, a population of children 
solving a transitivity task is potentially divisible into “nonoperational” 
and “operational” subpopulations, based on their respective ways of 
inferring judgments on that task. (Note that the two subpopulations are 
defined in a task-specific manner; we do not assume that children solving 
one task operationally will necessarily solve other tasks in the same way. 
As used here, the term “operational” describes a form of reasoning used 
by a child in a particular situation, not a general trait-like “competence” 
attributed to the child as an individual.) The distributional assumptions 
underlying the nonoperational and operational subpopulations, so under- 
stood, are illustrated in Table 1. 
In the nonoperational subpopulation, the underlying assumption is that 
memory for premises and transitivity judgments are stochastically inde- 
pendent. This assumption follows from the foregoing argument that mem- 
ory and judgments should be related only when subjects are reasoning 
operationally. Mathematically, this stochastic independence implies that 
the probabilities of the joint events determined by the pairing of accurate 
or inaccurate memory with correct or incorrect judgments (i.e., the prob- 
abilities pmj, PTiij, pm?, p& should be equal to the products of the cor- 
responding marginal probabilities (pmj = pdj, etc.). In the operational 
subpopulation, memory for premises and judgments are assumed to be 
dependent, because memory should always be accurate and judgments 
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TABLE 1 









(P&i PjlZYPT5 (Pmla P$YPa 
(Pqa P,lJPZ @-,a PylzYPa 
PjlZ P& 
Operational subpopulation 
Accurate PO 0 PO 
Inaccurate 0 0 0 
Total PO 0 PO 
Note. Cell entries represent the marginal probabilities for the events indicated, under the 
distributional assumptions described in the text. All probabilities are expressed relative to 
the total population. 
should always be correct. The relation between the two variables is thus 
deterministic, rather than stochastic. To be sure, some cases of inaccu- 
rate memory and incorrect judgments are likely to be observed in any 
sample drawn from this population because of measurement, comprehen- 
sion, or production errors. But in the ideal, theoretical model depicted in 
Table 1, these sources of error are overlooked. 
From the earliest age at which children begin to develop operational 
reasoning with respect to a given task, any random sample of children 
tested on that task will be drawn from a total population composed of 
nonoperational and operational subpopulations in proportions ranging be- 
tween 0 and 1 .OO. Further, a stochastic dependence between memory and 
judgments is expected to occur in the total population, resulting from the 
admixture of an operational subpopulation (in which judgments and mem- 
ory are related deterministically) to a nonoperational subpopulation (in 
which judgments and memory are stochastically independent). If p0 is the 
proportion of children using operational reasoning in the total population, 
then the distributional model of that total population can be determined as 
shown in Table 2. 
This distributional model makes it possible to estimate the minimum 
value of p0 necessary to reject reasoning-remembering independence for 
various values of pm and pj, thereby providing a method for checking 
previous reports of independence between reasoning and remembering in 
children. Before applying this method, however, it is prudent to test the 
“reasonableness” of the model with reference to empirical findings. 
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TABLE 2 




premises Correct Incorrect Total 
Accurate @ml?5 PjlZYPZ + PO (Pm13 P~ldP~ + 0 Pm 
Inaccurate (Pi& P,,d/Pii + 0 &-la PjlzlPlPa + 0 Piii 
Total pj p7 1.00 
NOW. Cell entries represent the joint probabilities and marginal probabilities which result 
from adding the respective probabilities in the nonoperational and operational subpopula- 
tions given in Table 2. 
TESTING THE MODEL 
In order to test the assumptions underlying the distributional model 
described in the preceding section, the data reported by Chapman and 
Lindenberger (1988) will be reanalyzed for reasoning-remembering de- 
pendencies. For this purpose, only the data from their “standard” tran- 
sitivity tasks will be used. This was the version of the transitivity task in 
which length and weight were not correlated with spatial position. It was 
therefore the only version in which reasoning-remembering dependencies 
might be expected to occur. First, Chapman and Lindenberger’s total 
sample will be analyzed for reasoning-remembering dependence after the 
manner of Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985). Then, the predictions gen- 
erated by the present model for operational and nonoperational subpop- 
ulations considered separately will be tested. 
As described in the original article, Chapman and Lindenberger gave 
3-, 4-, and 5-term transitivity-of-length tasks and 3- and 4-term transitiv- 
ity-of-weight tasks to 120 first, second, and third graders with mean ages 
of 7.06, 7.91, and 8.95, respectively. The “standard” transitivity-of- 
length tasks were administered with color-coded sticks of varying lengths. 
First, adjacent “premise” comparisons were presented by placing the 
two sticks upright next to each other on the table so that the difference 
between lengths was clearly visible. When all premise comparisons had 
been presented in this way, memory for premises was checked by rein- 
troducing each pair of sticks, this time with their ends hidden from view 
so that differences in length could not be seen, and asking children if they 
could remember which stick was longer. If they could not remember, or 
if their memory was inaccurate, the length differences were demonstrated 
once again and the memory check repeated. The second time, however, 
failures were not corrected. Instead, the experimenter proceeded to pose 
the transitivity problem, showing children the end terms of the n-term 
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length series and asking children which of them was longer. Again, sticks 
were presented with their ends hidden so that length differences could not 
be seen. Finally, children were asked to explain their answers. Weight 
tasks were administered in an analogous manner, except that comparison 
objects were color-coded balls differing in size and weight, and weight 
differences were demonstrated by the experimenter with a balance scale. 
A complete description of the procedures is provided in Chapman and 
Lindenberger (1988) .3 
3 Because our argument relies in part on the results of Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) 
it is important to consider some recent criticisms of that study by Howe and Rabinowitz 
(1990): 
a. Chapman and Lindenberger were said to provide no direct evidence for a dependence 
between reasoning and memory for premises, because “no memory measures were taken.” 
b. It is not clear how children could have given an operational explanation on Chapman 
and Lindenberger’s “alternate” task, because the comparison objects were not distin- 
guished by color as they were on the “standard” task. 
c. Chapman and Lindenberger’s finding that the difficulty of reasoning varied with the 
number of comparison objects for the “standard” task, but not for the “alternate” task was 
said to be an artifact of their design, because children in the “standard” tasks were tested 
on separate 3-, 4-, and Sterm problems whereas children in the “alternate” tasks were 
questioned about 3-, 4-, and Sterm (e.g., AC, AD, and AE) comparisons on a single Sterm 
display. In addition, children’s scores on the standard tasks were based on only one re- 
sponse, whereas scores on the “alternate” tasks were sometimes based on multiple re- 
sponses (i.e., 3-term scores were based on AC, ED, and CE comparisons, and 4-term scores 
were based on AD and BE comparisons). 
Although some of Howe and Rabinowitz’s remarks are well taken, others are based on 
misconceptions of the methods and goals of the Chapman and Lindenberger study. In any 
event, we believe that the essential conclusions of that study are not negated by the factors 
mentioned. 
a. The claim that Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) included no measures of children’s 
memory for premises is not true. The memory probes are described in their methods section, 
and the data bearing on the relation between judgments and memory for premises are 
described in this article. 
b. It was quite simple for children to give operational explanations on the “alternate” 
task, for example, by stating that A is longer than C, “because this one (pointing to A) is 
longer than that one (pointing to B), and that one (B) is longer than that one (C).” As noted 
by Chapman and Lindenberger (1988, p. 545), some children indeed gave operational jus- 
tifications as well as “functional” justifications, but in each case the functional explanation 
was preferred. If  anything, it should have been easier for children to give operational 
explanations on the alternate task, because all the comparison objects were present and they 
did not have to remember the colors of intermediate terms which were not perceptually 
present, as they had to do in the standard task. Although it is certainly possible that different 
colors in Chapman and Lindenberger’s alternate task might affect children’s answers in 
some way, it is by no means obvious a priori that such a control would alter their major 
results. 
c. Howe and Rabinowitz provide no evidence for their assertion that presenting 3-, 4-, 
and 5-term “alternate” tasks separately would eliminate the difference in difftculty patterns 
for “standard” versus “alternate” tasks in the Chapman and Lindenberger study. In fact, 
the necessary control already has been done by Brainerd and Kingma (1984), who presented 
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In the original study, children’s answers were classified according to a 
criterion involving both judgments and verbal justifications. However, 
judgments and justifications were also coded separately, making possible 
an analysis of the relation between memory and judgments independent of 
justifications in a manner comparable to that of Brainerd and Kingma 
(1984, 1985). The cross-classification of children’s memory for premises 
and transitivity judgments for each type of transitivity problem is pre- 
sented in Table 3. In that analysis, children’s memory for premises was 
considered “accurate” if they successfully recalled all the premise com- 
parisons necessary for operational reasoning (i.e., all the adjacent com- 
parisons). The x2 test of independence for each type of problem is also 
provided. 
As indicated in the table, memory for premises was independent of 
judgments for four of the five transitivity tasks. Only for the 3-term tran- 
sitivity of length task was memory significantly associated with judg- 
ments. Thus, the overall result would appear to be consistent with Brain- 
erd and Kingma’s (1984) finding of independence between children’s 
memory and transitivity judgments.4 However, the fact that an associa- 
3- and S-term tasks separately and obtained the same pattern of results (no difference in 
difficulty) as reported by Chapman and Lindenberger for the “alternate” task. The results 
of the “alternate” task are not at issue. The point of the Chapman and Lindenberger study 
was the demonstration that at least one version of the transitivity task exists (i.e., the 
“standard” version) in which the number of terms does make a difference and for which (as 
shown in this article) reason and remembering are related. As for Chapman and Linden- 
berger’s scoring of 3- and 4-term “alternate” problems with multiple responses, it was, in 
fact, a conservative procedure. Children were given a “pass” on these problems only if they 
passed all the comparisons in question (e.g., the AD and BD comparisons for the 5-term 
problem). If  anything, this procedure would tend to underestimate children’s performance, 
because the probability of passing them all must be less than (or equal to) the probability of 
passing each one individually. Therefore, any effect of using multiple responses would be to 
minimize Chapman and Lindenberger’s reported finding that the “alternate” tasks were 
passed at a much higher rate than the “standard” tasks. 
4 Although Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985) used likelihood ratios in testing the inde- 
pendence of judgments and memory, such tests become equivalent to the Pearson x2 tests 
used in this paper for large N. Note that their published description of the likelihood ratio 
test contained some errors (C. J. Brainerd, personal communication, June 16, 1989). Briefly, 
the null hypothesis of equality between (a) the conditional probability of a correct judgment, 
given accurate memory, and (b) the simple probability of a correct judgment (i.e., pim = pj) 
was said to imply that the joint probability of a correct judgment and accurate memory was 
equal to the joint probability of a correct judgment and inaccurate memory (p,,,j = p&. The 
likelihood ratio test was derived from the latter equation (Brainerd & Kingma, 1985, p. 223). 
In fact, pti = pS does not follow from pjlm = Pj, as can be verified from the formula for 
conditional probabilities. Further, it is unnecessary to test the hypothesis p,,, = Pi sepa- 
rately from the hypothesis that P,,,,, = p, as stated by Brainerd and Kingma, because 2 x 
2 tables have only 1 degree of freedom and therefore each of these equalities implies the 
other. 
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TABLE 3 
















3-term transitivity of length 
80 23 
7 10 
4-term transitivity of length 
51 21 
27 15 
Sterm transitivity of length 
31 16 
31 36 
3-term transitivity of weight 
72 28 
12 8 








Note. xz values corrected for continuity (Yates’ correction). 
*p < ,005. 
tion was found even for one of the five tasks argues for caution in drawing 
any general conclusions before completing the second analysis of opera- 
tional and nonoperational subpopulations separately. 
The major assumptions of the distributional model described in the 
previous section can be summarized as follows: (a) the total population 
from which any sample of children is drawn can be partitioned into non- 
operational and operational subpopulations for each task; (b) memory for 
premises and transitivity judgments are stochastically independent in the 
nonoperational subpopulation; and (c) memory is always accurate and 
judgments are always correct in the operational subpopulation, ignoring 
the effects of measurement and processing error. In order to test the 
reasonableness of these assumptions, some method of estimating mem- 
bership in the operational subpopulation is required. As described below, 
the most important of the three assumptions is the third one, leading to a 
prediction of reasoning-remembering dependencies in the operational 
subpopulation. Therefore, the method of estimating membership in that 
subpopulation should be characterized by low false-positive measurement 
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error: In order to test a theoretical characteristic of this subpopulation, 
one should have confidence that the sample selected actually belongs to 
that population. Less important for this purpose is the possibility that 
some subjects belonging to the desired subpopulation are not selected 
(false-negative measurement error). 
Although we agree that children’s verbal justifications do not necessar- 
ily reflect the forms of their intrapsychic inference, we believe that verbal 
justifications are appropriate for the specific purpose of estimating mem- 
bership in the operational subpopulation for the following reasons: As 
mentioned previously, the use of verbal justifications frequently has been 
criticized as involving high false-negative measurement error. Brainerd 
(1973, 1977) and others (e.g., Braine, 1959; Gruen, 1966; Siegel, 1978) 
have argued that children might fail to give operational justifications, not 
because they cannot (or do not) reason operationally, but because they 
cannot put their reasoning into words. However, false-negative error (not 
sampling all children using operational reasoning) is less serious a prob- 
lem for present purposes than false-positive error (sampling children who 
in fact did not use operational reasoning). In this connection, both the 
critics and defenders of verbal methods agree that using verbal justilica- 
tions as criteria for concrete operational reasoning is likely to involve low 
false-positive error (Brainerd, 1973; see also Reese & Schack, 1974).5 
Accordingly, children were judged as belonging to the operational sub- 
population if they justified their transitivity judgments with reference to 
all the premise comparisons between adjacent terms in the series. Such 
operational justifications were coded with sufficient interrater reliability 
(95% agreement) in Chapman and Lindenberger’s (1988) study to permit 
their use for this purpose. 
The assumption that only accurate memory for premises and correct 
judgments would be found in the operational subpopulation was tested by 
’ One might object to this conclusion regarding low false-positive measurement error with 
the following argument: Children could infer a correct answer by one form of reasoning and 
“rationalize” their answers after the fact through some other form of reasoning, as has been 
reported for adults (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This type of error would pose a problem 
of interpretation if the predicted dependence between judgments and memory for premises 
in the operational subpopulation failed to materialize. Then one would not know if this lack 
of dependence was attributable to the fact that (a) children inferred their judgments opera- 
tionally but did so (somehow!) without accurate memory for premises and/or without correct 
judgments, or(b) children classified as “operational” because of theirjudgments did not use 
operational reasoning in drawing their inferences. The problem of false-positive measure- 
ment error would be less problematic if the predicted dependence were obtained-a result 
that would be consistent with the conclusions that the (a) false positive error rate was low 
and (b) predicted dependence between children’s judgments and memory for premises is 
found when children infer their judgments operationally. In fact, the second of these two 
results was obtained, suggesting that false-positive errors were not a problem. 
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TABLE 4 
CROSS CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR PREMISES AND TRANSITIVITY 
JUDGMENTS, BY FORMS OF JUSTIFICATION 







3-term transitivity of length 
Accurate 2s 23 55 0 
Inaccurate 7 10 0 0 
4-term transitivity of length 
Accurate 37 21 14 0 
Inaccurate 27 15 0 0 
5-term transitivity of length 
Accurate 28 16 3 0 
Inaccurate 31 36 0 0 
3-term transitivity of weight 
Accurate 38 28 34 0 
Inaccurate 12 8 0 0 
4-term transitivity of weight 
Accurate 52 33 9 0 
Inaccurate 16 10 0 0 
Note. Error cells indicated with italics. 
partitioning each memory-by-judgments cross-classification matrix 
shown in Table 4 into two submatrices according to children’s forms of 
justification. These submatrices are shown in Table 4. One submatrix 
(labelled “nonoperational”) included children who gave nonoperational 
justifications or no justifications at all. This group was assumed to include 
children belonging to the nonoperational subpopulation as well as an un- 
known proportion of children from the operational subpopulation who 
nevertheless did not give operational justifications (i.e., the false nega- 
tives). The other submatrix included only children who gave operational 
justifications, that is, justifications referring to all the relevant premise 
comparisons (e.g., “A is longer than C, because A is longer than B and B 
is longer than C”). This group was assumed to include only children 
belonging to the operational subpopulation (i.e., a negligible number of 
false positives). 
From the distributional model described previously, the following pre- 
dictions regarding the two submatrices shown in Table 4 were derived: (a) 
No significant association between memory and judgments should be 
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found in the nonoperational submatrix, under the assumption that the 
false-negative error rate was reasonably low, and (b) all observations in 
the operational submatrix should fall into the cell defined by accurate 
memory and correct judgments, assuming a negligible false-positive error 
rate. The other three cells in the operational submatrix are “error cells,” 
which should be empty according to theory. For several reasons, the 
second of these predictions is the more meaningful one. Not only does the 
first prediction involve the dubious practice of accepting the null hypoth- 
esis of independence as well as an assumption regarding the low rate of 
false negatives, but as we shall see presently, meaningful relations be- 
tween memory and judgments might not always be detected even if they 
exist. Consistent with the second prediction, all observations in the op- 
erational submatrix fell in the cell defined by accurate memory and cor- 
rect judgments as shown in Table 4. The error cells (indicated by italics in 
the table) were empty, as predicted. 
Test statistics relevant to both predictions are presented in Table 5. The 
prediction of independence between memory for premises and transitivity 
judgments in the nonoperational submatrices of each type of transitivity 
task was tested with x2 tests of association, and the prediction that no 
observations in the operational submatrix should fall into the error cells 
defined by inaccurate memory or incorrect judgments was tested with the 
PRE-statistic, a measure of Proportional Reduction of Error (Hildebrand, 
Laing, & Rosenthal, 1977; von Eye & Brandtstadter, 1988). The signifi- 
cance of PRE was tested by the normal approximation to the binomial as 
recommended by von Eye and Brandstadter (1988). According to this 
procedure, the null hypothesis that PRE equals 0 (i.e., that the number of 
TABLE 5 















0.24 1.00 4.89** 
0.21 1.00 2.76** 
1.38 1.00 1.21 
0.00 1.00 3.s7** 
0.00 1.00 1.92* 
Note. Both x2 and z values corrected for continuity. 
*p < .os. 
** p < .ool. 
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observations falling in the error cells is equal to the number expected by 
chance) is tested against the alternative hypothesis that PRE is greater 
than 0 (that the number of observed errors is less than that expected by 
chance). In the present case, a separate prediction analysis was per- 
formed for each transitivity task shown in Table 4. Expected cell frequen- 
cies were determined from the marginal distributions for operational ver- 
sus nonoperational justifications, correct versus incorrect judgments, and 
accurate versus inaccurate memory for premises. Thus, the probability of 
an observation occurring in a given cell ijk was derived from the respec- 
tive marginal probabilities corresponding to those dimensions (pijk = pi 
pj &. This null distribution is based on the assumption of independence 
among the three dimensions and forms the background against which 
predictions of specific dependencies are tested (von Eye & Brandtstadter, 
1988). 
As indicated in the table, the x2 tests were nonsignificant for all the 
transitivity tasks, but PRE was significantly greater than 0 at a Bonferroni 
criterion of .OOI (= .005/S) for three of the five tasks. The fact that PRE 
was equal to 1.00 for each task means that prediction was perfect (no 
errors were observed) in each case, but the numbers of children in the 
operational submatrices for the j-term length task and the 4-term weight 
task were too small to reach significance. The fact that prediction was 
perfect in the total sample implies that the observed relation between 
judgments and memory was obtained within each of the three age groups 
as well. Therefore, the results described in Tables 4 and 5 are not artifacts 
of combining data from children of different ages. The numbers of oper- 
ational reasoners in the first-, second-, and third-grade groups, respec- 
tively, were as follows: 3-term length task-lo, 21, 24; 4-term length 
task-l, 5, 8; 5-term length task-O, 1, 2; 3-term weight task-3, 14, 17; 
4-term weight-l, 4, 4. 
Two general observations can be made about these results. First, they 
are indeed consistent with the predictions derived from the distributional 
model summarized in Table 2: (a) For children giving nonoperational 
justifications, memory was unrelated to judgments; (b) for children giving 
operational justifications, memory was always accurate and judgments 
were always correct. Although the latter finding might appear to be intu- 
itively obvious, it was by no means inevitable. If Brainerd and Kingma’s 
(1984, 1985) hypothesis of independence between reasoning and remem- 
bering were correct, then one might expect some children to have an- 
swered the memory probes inaccurately but to have guessed or recon- 
structed the relevant premises in giving an operational justification. And 
if the cognitive processes by which children’s judgments are generated 
are not necessarily reflected in their verbal justifications (Braine, 1959; 
Brainerd, 1973), then one might expect at least some children giving op- 
146 CHAPMAN AND LINDENBERGER 
erational justifications to have incorrect judgments. Although the oppo- 
site combination (correct judgment and nonoperational justification) 
might be considered more likely to occur, the combination of incorrect 
judgment and operational justification has indeed been reported to occur 
with low frequency under some task conditions (e.g., Russell, 1981), as 
mentioned previously. 
The second observation to be made is that the reasoning-remembering 
dependencies indicated by the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 were not 
detected by the x2 tests for the total sample shown in Table 3, except for 
the 3-term transitivity of length task. This result raises doubts about the 
power of tests of association for detecting reasoning-remembering depen- 
dencies, even if they do exist. This question of statistical power will now 
be examined more closely. 
CONDITIONS FOR REJECTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
OF INDEPENDENCE 
Under the assumption that the distributional model shown in Table 2 
characterizes the total population from which children are sampled, the 
minimum proportion of operational reasoners (P,*) necessary to reject 
the null hypothesis of independence in tests of association can be calcu- 
lated. This is accomplished by substituting the values given in Table 2 into 
the familiar computational formula for a 2 x 2 x2 test of independence, 
simplifying, and solving for P,. This procedure yields the following for- 
mula: 
PO* = [(;;;;:)“2+ 11-l (1) 
where PO* is the minimum proportion of true operational reasoners in a 
sample of N children, at the (Y level of significance, for the hypothetical 
population probabilities pj and pm (where pj = 1 - pj and pm = 1 - p,). 
The values of PO* obtained by this method for (Y < .05, N = 100, and 
various combinations of pm and pj between .20 and 90 are presented in 
Table 6. 
It should be emphasized that the values of PO* in Table 6 are minimum 
values obtained under the ideal assumption that the sample conforms 
perfectly to the theoretical model in Table 2. In other words, the effects 
of measurement error or other sources of random error are ignored. Given 
the existence of error in any actual sample, other deviations from the 
theoretical model, or N < 100, the critical values are likely to be larger. 
Nevertheless, one is impressed at how large the values of PO* in Table 6 
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TABLE 6 
MINIMUM PROPORTION OF OPERATIONAL REASONERS NEEDED TO RUECT NULL 
HYPOTHESIS OF INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN MEMORY AND JUDGMENTS 
Probability of 
accurate memory .20 .30 
Probability of correct judgment 
.40 .50 ho JO .80 .90 
.20 .05 .07 .08 .09 .ll .14 .17 .23 
.30 .07 .08 .lO .12 .14 .17 .21 .28 
.40 .08 .lO .12 .14 .17 .20 .25 .35 
.50 .09 .12 .14 .17 .20 .24 .29 .38 
.60 .ll .14 .17 .20 .23 .27 .33 .42 
.70 .14 .17 .20 .24 .27 .32 .38 .48 
.80 .17 .21 .25 .29 .33 .38 .44 .55 
.90 .23 .28 .35 .38 .42 .48 .55 .64 
Note. Table entries calculated from Eq. (1) for x2,0s (1) = 3.841 and N = 100. 
are, even under the ideal conditions described. For values of p, and pj 
greater than SO, nearly one-fifth of the sample could be true operational 
reasoners without rejecting the null hypothesis of independence between 
memory and judgments. For p, and Pj greater than .70, more than one- 
third of the sample would have to be operational to reject the null hy- 
pothesis. In short, tests of association are not particularly sensitive for 
detecting the type of reasoning-remembering dependency that exists in 
operational reasoners, even under the overly optimistic assumption of 
negligible measurement error. 
As an illustration of the limitations on statistical power represented by 
the figures in Table 6, the critical proportions (P,*) necessary to reject the 
null hypothesis of independence for the Chapman and Lindenberger 
(1988) data were calculated from Eq. 1. The resulting values for PO*, the 
observed proportions P, and Pj used in calculating PO*, as well as the 
observed proportion P, of children giving operational justifications are 
given in Table 7. For each transitivity task, PO* represents the minimum 
proportion of true operational reasoners necessary to reject the null hy- 
pothesis of independence in x2 tests of association under the distributional 
assumptions described in preceding sections. For present purposes, P, 
may be regarded as a rather conservative estimate of the proportion of 
operational reasoners in the population. The main result shown in the 
table is the fact that P, exceeds PO* only for the 3-term transitivity of 
length task. Therefore, one would expect a significant association be- 
tween memory and judgments to be found only for this task, precisely the 
result that was obtained (see Table 3). Despite the fact that the estimated 
proportion of operational reasoners was quite high for some of the other 
tasks (at least 28% for the 3-term transitivity of weight task), significant x2 
tests would not be expected because P, < PO*. 
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TABLE 7 
OBSERVEDPROPORTIONSOFACCURATEMEMORY(P,),CORRECTJUDGMENT(P~),AND 













0.86 0.73 0.46 0.42 
0.65 0.65 0.12 0.25 
0.39 0.57 0.03 0.14 
0.83 0.70 0.28 0.38 
0.78 0.64 0.08 0.31 
u Calculated from Eq. 1 for x*,05 (1) = 3.841, N = 120, and observed values of P,,, and Pj. 
REINTERPRETING PREVIOUS RESULTS 
The foregoing analyses provide a basis for reinterpreting previous re- 
ports of independence between reasoning and remembering, beginning 
with the studies of transitive reasoning reviewed by Brainerd and Kingma 
(1984). In their reanalysis of data reported by Halford and Galloway 
(1977), Russell (1981), and Kingma (1981), Brainerd and Kingma found no 
statistically reliable dependencies between children’s transitivity judg- 
ments and their memory for premise comparisons. However, they note 
that such statistical independence could have resulted from methodolog- 
ical problems in all three of those studies (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, pp. 
328-329). In each case, the procedures used to measure judgments and 
memory were in some way incomparable, introducing significant sources 
of measurement error into one or the other of the two variables. In Hal- 
ford and Galloway’s study, a horizontal-vertical visual illusion was em- 
ployed in presenting transitivity questions but not memory probes. There- 
fore, transitivity judgments and memory for premises might have been 
unrelated because judgments, but not memory, would have depended in 
part on the ability to resist the illusion. In Russell’s and in Kingma’s 
studies, memory for premises was inferred from children’s verbal expla- 
nations of theirjudgments. Thus, memory for premises as assessed would 
have depended not only on accurate memory, but also on whatever verbal 
skills and reasoning abilities are involved in formulating a verbal expla- 
nation. Transitivity judgments and memory for premises might have been 
unrelated in these studies because of the measurement error associated 
with this use of explanations as a measure of memory. 
Because of the methodological problems associated with these previous 
studies, Brainerd and Kingma (1984) conducted a series of their own 
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transitivity studies in which memory for premises and transitivity judg- 
ments were assessed with comparable methods. Both memory and tran- 
sitivity judgments were elicited by asking children which of the two com- 
parison objects was longer or heavier in the length and weight tasks, 
respectively. With this procedure, the results of the previous studies were 
confirmed: Memory for premises and transitivity judgments were statis- 
tically unrelated. Brainerd and Kingma explained these results in terms of 
a “fuzzy trace theory,” according to which children do not solve transi- 
tivity problems by coordinating precise memory traces of the individual 
premise relations, “A is longer than B,” is longer than C,” and so on. 
Instead, they solve such problems with reference to imprecise (i.e., 
“fuzzy”) memory traces of the form, “Things get bigger toward the 
right.” Memory for individual premise relations are stochastically inde- 
pendent of transitivity judgments, because those judgments are obtained 
by other means. 
This “fuzzy trace theory” was advanced by Brainerd and Kingma 
(1984) as a general theory of transitive reasoning (indeed, as a theory of 
children’s reasoning in general-see Brainerd & Kingma, 1985). As men- 
tioned previously, however, Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) argued 
that children could solve transitivity tasks through the use of right-left 
spatial position cues only if the relevant dimension (length or weight) was 
in fact correlated with spatial position (as in their “alternate” transitivity 
tasks). If, in contrast, the relevant dimension was uncorrelated with po- 
sition cues (as in their “standard” tasks), children would be unable to use 
position cues and would solve the transitivity tasks through a composition 
of premise relations instead. Dependencies between children’s transitiv- 
ity judgments and their memory for premises would be expected only 
under the “standard” conditions. Because the procedures used by Brain- 
erd and Kingma in assessing transitive reasoning were comparable to 
Chapman and Lindenberger’s “alternate” task, the absence of reasoning- 
remembering dependencies in Brainerd and Kingma’s studies of transi- 
tivity can be explained by the fact that their task did not require the form 
of reasoning for which reasoning-remembering dependencies would be 
expected. As indicated in the present analyses, reasoning-remembering 
dependencies indeed are found when children are tested under the 
“standard” conditions instead. 
The same principle holds for the other cognitive tasks for which Brain- 
erd and Kingma (1984, 1985) reported a reasoning-remembering indepen- 
dence. A dependency between judgments and memory for premises 
would be expected only under conditions in which children actually refer 
to the specific premises for which memory is tested in making their judg- 
ments. For example, Brainerd and Kingma tested the relation between 
children’s class inclusion judgments and their memory for the cardinal 
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numbers of objects in the relevant superordinate and subordinate classes. 
Although the knowledge that there are 7 boys and 3 girls and 10 children 
altogether might be sufJicient for inferring that “there are more children 
than boys,” it is not necessary for such a judgment. According to Inhelder 
and Piaget’s (1959/1969) further analysis, the class inclusion problem in- 
volves the quantification of classes with the logical quantifiers “all” and 
“some.” Thus, a typical justification of a correct class inclusion judgment 
has the following form: “There are more children than boys, because 
they’re all children but only some are boys.” Another typical justification 
has the form of class addition: “. . . because the boys and girls are both 
children.” Such forms of reasoning could be employed in inferring class 
inclusion judgments, even if children did not remember the exact cardi- 
nality of the classes involved. Because memory for the cardinality of 
classes is not a necessary condition for inferring a correct judgment with 
concrete operational reasoning, a dependency between memory for car- 
dinality and class inclusion judgments is not to be expected. 
The argument is similar for Brainerd and Kingma’s (1985) probability 
judgment task. In this case, the premises for which memory was tested 
were the cardinal numbers of two types of animals (e.g., 7 turtles and 3 
birds) in an opaque container, and the question was which animal was 
most likely to be drawn by chance. But children could have inferred that 
a turtle was more likely from the fact that the container contained more 
turtles, quite apart from their exact number. In other words, children 
could have inferred likelihood as a function of relative numerosity without 
necessarily remembering the cardinal numbers of each animal. 
In contrast, Brainerd and Kingma (1984) did test the relation between 
conservation judgments and memory for those premises that children 
actually might be expected to use in inferring those judgments. According 
to Piaget and Inhelder’s (1941/1974) analysis, children solve the familiar 
conservation of liquid problem in the following way: From the knowledge 
that (a) the amount of liquid in beaker A is the same as that in beaker B 
of the same size and shape, together with the knowledge that (b) the 
amount of liquid in B remains the same when it is poured into beaker B’ 
of a different shape, children can infer the judgment that (c) the amount of 
liquid in A is the same as that in B’. Brainerd and Kingma (1984) found a 
significant dependence of conservation judgments (A = B’) on memory 
for one of those premises (B = B’), but not for the other one (A = B). 
According to the distributional model described in this paper, such a 
result could be explained by the fact that the probability of accurate 
memory for B = B’ was relatively low (0.353), but that for A = B was 
quite high (0.801). Given N = 95 and the probability of a correct judgment 
equal to 0.249 (Brainerd 8z Kingma, 1984, p. 369), Eq. 1 yields a value of 
0.078 for B = B’ and 0.189 for A = B. In other words, 8% or more of the 
sample would have to be operational reasoners in order to obtain a sig- 
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nificant dependence between the premise B = B’ and the conservation 
judgment A = B’, but about 19% or more would be necessary to obtain 
dependence between A = B and the same conservation judgment. Thus, 
an absence of a dependency between conservation judgments and the 
presumed premise A = B does not necessarily imply that children did not 
employ that premise in inferring their judgments. Instead, the data are 
consistent with the conclusion that Brainerd and Kingma’s sample com- 
prised between 8 and 19% operational reasoners who used both premises. 
In a sample of kindergartners and first graders, such a range is not un- 
likely. 
The overall point is that, even if the major condition for testing reason- 
ing-remembering dependencies is met-that memory is tested for the 
premises actually used under the particular task conditions-the present 
analysis indicates that such reasoning-remembering dependencies would 
be found only if the proportion of operational reasoners in the sample is 
sufficiently large. The value of the present distributional model is that it 
provides a way of estimating this critical proportion, given the probabil- 
ities of accurate memory and correct judgments. The critical proportion 
of operational reasoners is higher, the higher the probabilities of accurate 
memory and correct judgment. 
More generally, the analysis of the statistical dependencies between 
judgments and memory for premises provides the researcher with a gen- 
eral method for testing hypotheses regarding the forms of reasoning by 
which those judgments were inferred. The hypothesis that a given judg- 
ment, J, is derived inferentially from a given set of premises, P, can be 
tested by examining the statistical dependency between J and memory for 
P-provided that the minimal conditions for the use of this method as 
described in this article are fulfilled. One important advantage of this 
method is that it can be applied independently of verbal justifications, 
which previously have been the most frequently used means of distin- 
guishing among differing structural models of inferential reasoning. The 
major problem with using children’s verbal justifications for assessing the 
forms of their intrapsychic inferences is that a justification of a judgment 
once obtained may or may not reflect the process by which that judgment 
was generated. As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and others have found for 
adult subjects, justifications might be after-the-fact “rationalizations” of 
conclusions arrived at by other means. As a result of these methodolog- 
ical considerations, the trend in cognitive-developmental psychology has 
been to ignore children’s verbal justifications more or less entirely and to 
focus instead on judgments only or on various “nonverbal” assessment 
procedures (Braine, 1959; Brainerd, 1973; Siegel, 1978). Unfortunately, 
the results obtained through such procedures have been subject to inter- 
pretive ambiguities of their own (Larsen, 1977; Miller, 1976). 
As stated in the introduction to this article, our position is that the 
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exclusive focus on intrapsychic inference in cognitive-developmental psy- 
chology has led to a neglect of verbal justifications as phenomena of 
interest in their own right (Chapman, 1991). One reason why justifications 
are of interest is because, according to some major theorists (Piaget, 
1924/1928; Vygotsky, 1934/1986), intrapsychic inference develops 
through sociogenesis-more precisely through the interiorization of in- 
terpersonal argumentation. The significance of verbal justifications in this 
connection is that they are the primary moves in argumentation; one 
attempts to convince other persons of one’s own point of view by pro- 
viding them with reasons that would justify its acceptance. Moreover, if 
intrapsychic inference develops from an interpersonal context of justifi- 
cation, then one would expect some congruence between the develop- 
ment of competence in justification and the development of competence 
in intrapsychic inference. Once a particular form of reasoning is mas- 
tered, it could be used both for purposes of justification (in moving from 
a given conclusion to the premises which justify it) and for deductive 
inference (in moving from a given set of premises to the conclusion’s) 
which follow from them. In this view, justification and intrapsychic in- 
ference are conceptually distinct, but theoretically related competencies. 
The nature and degree of the relation between them are empirical ques- 
tions . 
Those questions can be addressed with the method outlined in this 
article. If children use the same form of reasoning for justifying their 
judgments as they used in inferring those judgments, then children should 
justify their judgments with reference to the same premises from which 
they originally derived those judgments and a reasoning-remembering 
dependency between judgments and memory for said premises should be 
found. In effect, this hypothesis was tested in the analyses shown in 
Tables 4 and 5. The results were straightforward: Children giving opera- 
tional justifications (“A > C, because A > B and B > C”) showed pre- 
cisely the pattern of reasoning-remembering dependency to be expected if 
they also had inferred their judgments through a composition of the same 
premises (i.e., “A > B and B > C, therefore A > C”). 
However, such results should not be interpreted to the effect that jus- 
tifications are valid measures of inference after all. For one thing, the 
problem of false negatives remains; an unknown number of children who 
gave nonoperational justifications nevertheless might have inferred their 
judgments from a composition of A > B and B > C. For another thing, one 
cannot assume that such a congruence between justifications and infer- 
ences would be found for other tasks or under other task conditions. In 
our view, the problem with previous discussions of children’s verbal jus- 
tifications as response criteria was the assumption that justifications are 
of interest only as potential measures of intrapsychic inference. Instead, 
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we suggest that justification should be considered a distinct competence 
of theoretical interest in itself and that the relation between justification 
and intrapsychic inference is an important question for theory and re- 
search. 
THEORIES OF TRANSITIVE INFERENCE 
In this final section, the broader implications of the foregoing results for 
theories of children’s reasoning are discussed. Four different theories are 
briefly considered: (a) the fuzzy truce theory of Brainerd and his col- 
leagues (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984, 1985; Brainerd & Reyna, 1989, 1990; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1990), (b) the mental logic approach, typified by 
Braine and Rumain (1983), (c) the mental models approach of Johnson- 
Laird (1983), and (d) the operational-constructive theory, which we de- 
rive from Piaget. We begin with fuzzy trace theory, because it provided 
the original impetus for this investigation and because it differs from the 
other three in its emphasis on nondeductive processes in reasoning. We 
then continue with an attempt to differentiate the other three approaches 
as theories of deductive inference, with particular emphasis on develop- 
ing a nontraditional version of Piagetian constructivism. 
Fuzzy Truces versus Deductive Inference 
In Brainerd and Reyna’s (1990) comprehensive statement of fuzzy trace 
theory to date, the theory was summarized in 7 points. The last 3 of those 
points, dealing with issues of response interference, cognitive resources, 
and development, respectively, lie outside the immediate scope of this 
discussion (see Brainerd & Reyna, 1989, and the accompanying commen- 
taries). Instead, we limit ourselves here to a consideration of the first 4 
points insofar as they are relevant to theories of children’s reasoning and 
to theories of transitive reasoning in particular: 
1. At all ages, children encode incoming information not only in terms 
of direct, “verbatim” traces of that information, but also in terms of the 
basic “pattern” or “gist” that can be extracted from the original infor- 
mation. 
2. As a result, the information represented in working memory varies 
along a continuum of exactness, from verbatim traces at one end to fuzzy 
traces at the other. This continuum makes possible certain processing 
options in reasoning and other tasks, depending on which type of traces 
are being processed. However: 
3. Choice among possible options is governed by a preference for fuzzy 
processing because, among other reasons, they are more accessible, less 
complex, and require less effort. 
4. Such processing options extend to short-term memory. That is, 
short-term memory probes can be answered through either the simple 
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retrieval of memory traces (fuzzy or verbatim), or through their recon- 
struction. 
This last-named feature of the theory was said to account both for the 
occurrence of reasoning-remembering dependencies when they occur and 
for their absence when they do not occur. Briefly, the argument was that 
such dependencies should occur when memory probes can be answered 
through reconstructive processing of the same level of gist used in rea- 
soning, because then there is complete overlap between reasoning and 
remembering with respect to both the level of traces (fuzzy or verbatim) 
and the type of processing (reconstructive). In contrast, reasoning- 
remembering independence would be expected if memory probes are an- 
swered through simple retrieval of either kind of trace, because process- 
ing operations (and/or level of gist) are different for memory probes and 
reasoning tasks (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990, p. 33). 
The fuzzy trace theory of transitive reasoning was explained by Brain- 
erd and Reyna (1990, pp. 11-12) as follows: Children are presented with 
certain “background facts,” for example, three rods A, B, and C, of 
lengths 18, 17.5, and 17 cm, respectively. Children code these background 
facts along the continuum of exactness, from verbatim traces that reflect 
the background facts more or less exactly to fuzzy traces having the form, 
“Things get longer to my left.” (Between these two extremes are traces 
of intermediate exactness having the form, “A is long,” “B is short,” 
etc.). As previously described, this continuum allows for certain process- 
ing options: “Transitivity problems can be solved with left-right discrim- 
ination operations if global spatial patterns (“things get longer to my 
left”) are being processed, but logical operations may be required if the 
verbatim premises are being processed” (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990, p. 18). 
Brainerd and Reyna cited Chapman and Lindenberger (1988) for an ex- 
ample of such processing options, implying that the different results ob- 
tained by Chapman and Lindenberger in their “alternate” and 
“standard” transitivity tasks can be explained in this way. 
In our opinion, some deep ambiguities exist in fuzzy trace theory as 
summarized in the preceding paragraphs. First, there is ambiguity about 
the nature of “verbatim traces” and their relation to the “background 
facts” that they are supposed to represent. Brainerd and Reyna give the 
“background facts” for the transitivity task in terms of the exact lengths 
of the rods or sticks to be compared. The notion of “verbatim traces” 
seems to imply that children form direct percept-like “copies” of those 
lengths. However, one could state the “background facts” alternately in 
terms of the relations among comparison objects (A > B, etc.) or even 
(task conditions permitting) in terms of the spatial arrangement (“Things 
get bigger to the left”). What the “background facts” are in any given 
task is not an unequivocal proposition, and one wonders why only the 
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more exact representations of the facts (whether in terms of exact lengths 
or length relations) qualify as “verbatim traces.” We would suggest that 
the transitivity task is usually presented through the use of a verbal com- 
parative (e.g., “longer”) as to maximize the probability that children 
represent the problem in terms of length relations. “Verbatim” represen- 
tations could be construed, as the etymology of the term implies, in terms 
of the words employed. Thus, a relational representation (e.g., A > B) 
could be considered “verbatim” in a task in which the comparative 
“longer” was used explicitly in the presentation of premise information. 
The idea that the facts, however they are stated, can be represented in 
alternative ways by children goes without question. But we think that the 
best way of conceptualizing these alternatives is not necessarily in terms 
of the fuzzy-to-verbatim continuum. To us, the “verbatim” representa- 
tions and the “fuzzy” traces described by Brainerd and Reyna appear to 
differ inform, not merely in exactness. Representations of the form A = 
18 cm and B = 17.5 cm are numerical; representations of the form, “A is 
longer than B,” are relational; representations of the form, “A is long,” 
and “B is short,” are categorical; and representations of the form, 
“things get bigger to the right,” can be calledfunctional in the sense that 
relations of size (“bigger”) are represented as a function of spatial rela- 
tions (“to the right”). Presumably, any of these forms of representation 
could be more or less exact. Indeed, formal systems of “fuzzy reasoning” 
have been devised in which each type of term is allowed to vary in 
“fuzziness” (e.g., fuzzy sets, fuzzy relations, fuzzy functions, fuzzy nu- 
merical information-see Zedah, 1975). In fuzzy trace theory, theform of 
representation is confounded with fuzziness in this sense. 
More problematic in our opinion are the claims regarding the scope of 
fuzzy trace theory and the explanation of reasoning-remembering depen- 
dencies. In the passage quoted above, Brainerd and Reyna (1990) stated 
that the processing of fuzzy traces occurs when “global spatial patterns” 
permit; otherwise logical operations may be necessary. If so, then rea- 
soning by fuzzy traces occurs only under special conditions, and the 
problem of explaining how children reason when those conditions are not 
met remains. This was Chapman and Lindenberger’s (1988) argument: 
that solving a transitivity task by means of a “fuzzy trace” relating length 
or weight to spatial orientation is possible only under the special condi- 
tions that length or weight is actually correlated with spatial position. 
With respect to the explanation of reasoning-remembering dependen- 
cies, we believe that fuzzy trace theory is not entirely consistent. Brain- 
erd and Reyna (1990) argue that reasoning-remembering dependencies 
should be found when reasoning tasks and memory probes can be solved 
in the same way, that is, with the same traces and processes. This con- 
dition would appear to be met in the case of transitive reasoning when the 
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relevant dimension is correlated with spatial position (i.e., in Brainerd & 
Kingma’s, 1989, studies or in Chapman & Lindenberger’s “alternate” 
transitivity task). In that case, a fuzzy trace of the form, “Things get 
longer to my left,” should be sufficient to answer the transitivity question 
regarding the nonadjacent A-C comparison as well as the memory probes 
regarding the adjacent A-B and B-C comparisons through reconstructive 
processing. However, fuzzy trace processing was cited by Brainerd and 
Kingma (1984) as a reason why transitivity judgments and memory for 
nonadjacent premise comparisons ought not to be found on this version of 
the transitivity task, and indeed, they found no evidence for reasoning- 
remembering dependency in a number of studies. 
According to Reyna and Brainerd (1990), reasoning-remembering inde- 
pendence occurred in the Brainerd and Kingma studies because of errors 
of retrieval, of misunderstanding, of misperception, or of misidentifica- 
tion. This explanation seems eminently reasonable to us, but it would 
apply as well to all other cases in which memory probes can be answered 
in the same way as reasoning problems-that is, even in those cases 
which, according to Brainerd and Reyna (1990), fuzzy trace theory would 
predict reasoning-remembering dependence. We conclude that fuzzy 
trace theory is not entirely consistent on this point. 
One further problem is worth mentioning: Even if fuzzy trace theory 
accurately describes how children reason under some conditions, it does 
not address the problems of how and why some forms of reasoning are 
accompanied by a “sense of necessity”- the feeling that a given conclu- 
sion simply could not be otherwise. An inference of the form, “A is longer 
than B, because A is to the left of B,” may be objectively correct under 
the special conditions that length is correlated with right-left spatial po- 
sition, but the correctness of this inference depends on situation-specific 
empirical knowledge of the correlation between length and position. In 
contrast, both children and adults recognize an element of necessity in 
transitive inference (Miller, 1986), and explaining this sense of necessity 
and its development is a major task of an epistemologically sophisticated 
psychology of reasoning (Bickhard, 1988; Piaget, 1970/1972b). 
In summary, we believe that there are a number of ambiguities and/or 
inconsistencies in fuzzy trace theory which prevent it from being a sat- 
isfactory theory of children’s reasoning. At best, we think that it might be 
sufficient for explaining how children and adults might reason under cer- 
tain special conditions. But one must still explain how individuals reason 
under more generally and, in particular, how they reason according to 
standard deductive logic when in fact they do so. 
Mental Logic versus Mental Models 
Johnson-Laird (1983) contrasted two general approaches to human rea- 
soning which he labeled “mental logic” and “mental models.” In con- 
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trast to fuzzy trace theory, both of these approaches are explicit theories 
of deductive reasoning. “Mental logic” is the view that individuals draw 
inferences in reasoning tasks by applying rules of logic. The major prob- 
lem in this approach is to determine what these rules actually are. For 
Johnson-Laird, Piaget was the chief proponent of the mental logic, but 
Braine and Rumain’s (1983) effort to identify a natural logic of inference 
schemas based on theorems of propositional logic could be said to typify 
this approach as well. (The question of whether Piaget is appropriately 
classed as an advocate of mental logic is discussed later.) 
Curiously, Braine and Rumain do not discuss transitive reasoning at all, 
preferring to consider the knowledge of the transitivity inherent in rela- 
tions of length or weight as empirical, rather than “logical,” in nature. 
This dismissal of the “logical” character of transitive reasoning might be 
considered a shortcoming in itself, considering the fact that Miller’s (1986) 
subjects classed transitive reasoning with analytical deduction as involv- 
ing a sense of “logical” necessity. In any case, one can easily imagine 
how one might attempt to explain transitive reasoning within the mental 
logic approach. Briefly, one might assume that, given the premise com- 
parisons A > B and B > C, children apply a general “rule of transitivity.” 
Such a rule might be represented mentally in different ways, but stated in 
English it would have something like the following form: “For every 
length X, Y, and Z, if X > Y and Y > Z, then X > Z.” The transitivity 
problem would be solved by applying this rule to the problem at hand- 
that is, by evaluating the variables X, Y, and Z in terms of the objects A, 
B, and C, respectively. Such an application returns the conclusion A > C. 
Although the foregoing model provides an explanation of how transitive 
inferences are carried out (by applying the transitivity rule), it does so at 
the expense of begging the question of how the rule and the sense of 
necessity are acquired. Presumably, subjects understand the necessity of 
transitive reasoning, because that necessity is embodied in the rule. But 
the question remains how and understanding of the rule with its attendant 
sense of necessity develops originally. In short, the mental logic approach 
is especially vulnerable to the “learning paradox” as described by Pas- 
cual-Leone (1987): The understanding of transitivity is explained in a way 
that presupposes the understanding to be explained. 
Johnson-Laird’s (1983) criticism of the mental logic approach was 
somewhat different. At best, mental logic can explain how individuals 
reason correctly. It does not explain the kinds of logical errors in reason- 
ing that are typically observed in adult subjects, nor the kinds of extra- 
logical factors that influence the difficulty of different reasoning prob- 
lems. His “mental models” approach was an attempt to address such 
problems. In his view, subjects use premise information to construct 
schematic “tableaus” (or “mental models”) which represent the prob- 
lem, and those representations already contain the information pertaining 
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to the solution. Subjects obtain the solution simply by decoding the in- 
formation contained in the models. For example, the transitivity of length 
problem is solved, not by applying a rule of transitivity, but by mentally 
aligning the objects A > B > C along their length axes. Such a construc- 
tion makes the fact that A > C obvious to intuition. By applying this 
approach to a number of different tasks, Johnson-Laird was able not only 
to explain how subjects normally solved them, but also to predict the 
ways in which a number of extralogical factors influenced their perfor- 
mance . 
Because of Johnson-Laird’s success in providing explanations for the 
errors and biases typically found in everyday reasoning, Galotti (1989) 
named the mental models approach as the most promising approach to a 
general theory of human reasoning. Nevertheless, its reliance on mental 
“tableaus” makes it vulnerable to the epistemological problems inherent 
in representational theories of mind, such as how the subject knows that 
a given tableau is an accurate representation of reality (Russell, 1987). 
Moreover, one wonders how to explain the sense of necessity inherent in 
transitive reasoning within the mental models approach. Like most other 
psychological theories of deductive reasoning, it is an attempt to explain 
how subjects derive correct inferences, not how they are able to know 
whether or not their inferences are necessarily correct. In short, the men- 
tal models approach, like the mental logic approach, begs some important 
epistemological questions. 
Operational Constructivism 
As mentioned previously, Piaget’s theory of reasoning is commonly 
interpreted as an example of the mental logic approach, that is, as imply- 
ing that children solve reasoning problems through the application of 
logical rules as specified in his system of operatory logic (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1990; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Pascual-Leone, 1987). We believe that 
this interpretation misconstrues the constructivist thrust of his epistemo- 
logical theory and propose an alternative interpretation. The point is not 
necessarily that our interpretation reflects “what Piaget really believed.” 
Instead, we attempt to reconstruct the sense of operatory logic in the 
manner that we believe most consistently coheres with a constructivist 
epistemology. 
In this view, operatory logic is not a system of logical rules to be 
applied to a problem in order to infer a solution. Instead, it is a structural 
description of the system of operations involved in comprehending the 
problem. Thus, children comprehend physical relations involving length 
and weight in terms of certain operational criteria. For example, the 
relation “longer than” is comprehended in terms of an implicit operation 
of comparison in which one aligns the objects to be compared along their 
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length axes and notes which object protrudes beyond the other. That is 
what it meun~ for one object to be “longer than” another. It was in this 
sense that Piaget interpreted physical relations in terms of differences 
(e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1959/1969, p. 11). This approach does not entail 
a “reduction” of relations to differences (Seltman & Seltman, 1985); 
rather the criteria for comprehending the relation are the operations in- 
volved in noting a difference. (On the Wittgensteinian concept of 
“criteria,” see Chapman, 1987b.) 
The operational constructivist model of transitive reasoning can be 
understood in this context. Grasping the relation “A is longer than B” 
involves an implicit cognitive operation in which the two objects are 
aligned such that the difference in length between A and B is affirmed. An 
analogous operation is involved in grasping the relation between B and C. 
These operations of comparison play the role of the “first-order 
operations” discussed previously with respect to Piaget’s theory of con- 
crete operations. When asked about the relation between A and C, chil- 
dren apply a second-order operation to those first-order operations. 
Whereas the first-order operations generate differences in length between 
A and B and between B and C, the second order operation adds those 
differences together to obtain the total difference between A and C (cf. 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1959/1969, p. 11). For this purpose, precise estimates 
of the magnitudes of the AB and BC differences are unnecessary. The 
knowledge that one positive quantity (e.g., A - B) added to another (B - 
C) yields a third positive quantity (A - C) is sufficient to infer the fact 
that A is longer than C (i.e., that the difference A - C is positive). 
With this model of transitive reasoning, one can explain both the con- 
tent-dependence of the transitivity of length as well as the sense of 
“logical” necessity associated with it. On the one hand, both the first- 
order operations of comparison as well as the second-order addition of 
lengths are specifically adapted to the physical dimension of length. Pre- 
sumably, such adaptedness results from the fact that both the first- and 
second-order operations develop from the interiorization of physical ac- 
tions bearing on length. On the other hand, compositions of the first-order 
operations have uniquely determined results which are invariant across 
other physical dimensions such as color or shape. That uniqueness and 
invariance is the source of the sense of necessity-the sense that, given 
the outcomes of two comparisons of length (e.g., AB and BC), the out- 
come of a third comparison (AC) is not only fully determined, but could 
not be otherwise. 
By identifying deductive reasoning as an important phenomenon to be 
explained, we do not thereby commit ourselves to the view that rational 
thinking is essentially deductive in character, nor that deductive reason- 
ing, once it develops, replaces all other forms of reasoning. On the con- 
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trary, we agree with Brainerd and Reyna (1990) that children and adults 
possess optional forms of reasoning for solving particular problems and 
that, other things being equal, certain forms of reasoning will be preferred 
to others according to a principle of cognitive economy. In particular, we 
have argued that much of what passes for preoperational thinking in Pia- 
getian theory can be described in terms offunctional inference: deriving 
one dimension of experience as a function of another (Piaget, Grize, 
Szeminska, & Vinh Bang, 1967/1977). That capacity does not disappear 
with the development of deductive thought. Instead, it continues to exist 
in an enriched form as an alternative form of reasoning which has both 
advantages and disadvantages with respect to deduction. On the positive 
side, functional reasoning generally requires less mental effort than de- 
duction. In contrast, it lacks the certainty and necessity of deductive 
inference and is applicable only under a limited range of conditions when 
the dimensions in question are in fact functionally related. With respect to 
transitive reasoning, our argument has been that functional reasoning can 
only be employed to solve transitivity problems under the specific con- 
dition that relations of length are objectively correlated with spatial ori- 
entation. When those special conditions do not obtain, the analyses pre- 
sented in this article suggest that functional reasoning cannot be em- 
ployed and that deductive solutions are employed instead. 
Conclusion 
The results reported in this article indicate that, under suitable task 
conditions which prevent alternate solution strategies, a dependency ex- 
ists between transitivity judgments and memory for premise relations. 
This finding is consistent with the conclusion that, under the stated con- 
ditions, children solve transitivity problems by deduction from pairwise 
premise comparisons rather than from “fuzzy traces” of the type sug- 
gested by Brainerd and Kingma (1984). The main point was that testing 
for reasoning-remembering dependencies is a general method that can be 
used for determining whether a given conclusion in fact was derived from 
a given set of premises. A question for further research is whether it might 
also prove useful for discriminating among the different theories of de- 
ductive inference as described above. In any case, the general usefulness 
of the method depends on knowing the conditions under which one can 
expect it to yield valid conclusions. Describing those conditions was the 
main task of this article. 
REFERENCES 
Bickhard, M. (1988). Piagetian variation and selection models: Structuralism, logical neces- 
sity, and interactivism. Human Development, 31, 274-312. 
Braine, M. D. S. (1959). The ontogeny of certain logical operations: Piaget’s formulation 
MEMORY AND TRANSITIVE REASONING 161 
examined by nonverbal methods. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 
73(S), Whole No. 475), l-43. 
Braine, M. D. S., & Rumain, B. (1983). Logical reasoning. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Hand- 
book of child psychology, Vol. 3: Cognitive development (pp. 263-340). New York: 
Wiley. 
Brainerd, C. J. (1973). Judgments and explanations as criteria for the presence of cognitive 
structures. Psychological Bulletin, 79, 172-179. 
Brainerd, C. J. (1977). Response criteria in concept development. Child Development, 48, 
360-366. 
Brainerd, C., & Kingma, J. (1984). Do children have to remember to reason? A fuzzy-trace 
theory of transitivity development. Developmental Review, 4, 31 l-377. 
Brainerd, C., & Kingma, J. (1985). On the independence of short-term memory and working 
memory in cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 210-247. 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1989). Output-interference theory of dual-task deficits in 
memory development. Journal ofExperimental Child Psychology, 47, l-18. 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1990). Gist is the grist: Fuzzy-trace theory and the new 
intuitionism. Developmental Review, 10, 3-47. 
Breslow, L. (1981). Reevaluation of the literature on the development of transitive infer- 
ences. Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325-351. 
Bryant, P. E., & Trabasso, T. (1971). Transitive inferences and memory in young children. 
Nature, 232, 4X+458. 
Chapman, M. (1987a). Piaget, attentional capacity, and the functional implications of formal 
structure. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 20, 
pp. 289-334). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Chapman, M. (1987b). Inner processes and outward criteria: Wittgenstein’s importance for 
psychology. In M. Chapman & R. A. Dixon (Eds.), Meaning and the growth of under- 
standing (pp. 103-127). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Chapman, M. (1988). Constructive evolution: Origins and development of Piaget’s thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chapman, M. (1989). Resources versus response competition: A false disjunction? Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 47, 39-41. 
Chapman, M. (1991). The epistemic triangle: Operative and communicative components of 
cognitive competence. In M. J. Chandler and H. M. Chapman (Eds.), Criteria for com- 
petence: Controversies in the conceptualization and assessment of children’s abilities 
(pp. 209-228). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chapman, M. (in press). Everyday reasoning and the revision of belief. In J. Puckett & 
H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Mechanisms of everyday 
cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Chapman, M., & Lindenberger, U. (1988). Functions, operations, and decalage in the de- 
velopment of transitivity. Developmental Psychology, 24, 542-551. 
Chapman, M., & Lindenberger, U. (1989). Concrete operations and attentional capacity. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 47, 236-258. 
Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? The Behav- 
ioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 317-370. 
De Boysson-Barides, B., & O’Regan, K. (1973). What children do in spite of adults’ hy- 
potheses. Nature, 246, 531-534. 
Galotti, K. M. (1989). Approaches to, studying formal and everyday reasoning. Psych&g- 
ical Bulletin, 105, 331-351. 
Gruen, Cl. E. (1966). Note on conservation: Methodological and definitional considerations. 
Child Development, 37, 977-983. 
162 CHAPMAN AND LINDENBERGER 
Halford, G. S., & Galloway, W. (1977). Children who fail to make transitive inferences can 
remember comparisons. Australian Journal of Psychology, 29, 1-5. 
Halford, G. S., & Kelly, M. E. (1984). On the basis of early transitivity judgments. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 38, 42-63. 
Hall, V. C., & Kaye, D. B. (1978). The necessity of logical necessity in Piaget’s theory. In 
L. S. Siegel & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Alternatives to Piaget (pp. 153-167). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Hildebrand, D. K., Laing, J. D., & Rosenthal, H. (1977). Prediction analysis of cross clas- 
sifications. New York: Wiley. 
Howe, M. L., & Rabinowitz, F. M. (1990). Resource panacea? Or just another day in the 
developmental forest? Developmental Review, 10, 125-154. 
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1969). The early growth of logic in the child. New York: Norton 
(Original work published 1959) 
Johnson-Laud, P. N. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kallio, K. (1982). Developmental change on a five-term transitive inference. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 33, 142-164. 
Kingma, J. (1981). De ontwikkeling van quantitatieve en relationele begrippen btj’ kinderen 
van 4 tot 12 jaar. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of Groningen, The 
Netherlands. 
Larsen, G. Y. (1977). Methodology in developmental psychology: An examination of re- 
search on Piagetian theory. Child Development, 48, 116&l 166. 
Miller, S. A. (1976). Nonverbal assessment of Piagetian concepts. Psychological Bulletin, 
83, 405-430. 
Miller, S. A. (1986). Certainty and necessity in the understanding of Piagetian concepts. 
Developmental Psychology, 22, 3-18. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 
Pascual-Leone, J. (1987). Organismic processes for neo-Piagetian theories: A dialectical 
causal account of cognitive development. International Journal of Psychology, 22, 
53 l-570. 
Pemer, J., & Aebi, J. (1985). Feedback-dependent encoding of length series. British Journal 
of Developmental Psychology, 3, 133-141. 
Piaget, J. (1928). Judgment and reasoning in the child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
(Original work published 1924) 
Piaget, J. (1950). The psychology of intelligence. New York: Harcourt Brace. (Original work 
published 1947) 
Piaget, J. (1955). The language and thought of the child. Cleveland: Meridian. (Original 
work published 1923) 
Piaget, J. (1971). The theory of stages in cognitive development. In D. R. Green (Ed.), 
Measurement and Piaget (pp. l-l 1). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Piaget, J. (1972a). Essai de logique ope’ratoire. Paris: Dunod. (2nd ed. of Trait6 de logique, 
1949) 
Piaget, J. (1972b). The principles of genetic epistemology. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. (Original work published 1970) 
Piaget, J. (1986). Essay on necessity. Human Development, 29, 301-314. (Original work 
published 1977) 
Piaget, J. (1987a). Possibility and necessity. Vol. 2: The role of necessity in cognitive de- 
velopment. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1983) 
Piaget, J. (1987b). Possibility and necessity. Vol. 1: The role of possibility in cognitive 
development. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 
1981) 
MEMORY AND TRANSITIVE REASONING 163 
Piaget, J., Grize, J.-B., Szeminska, A., & Vinh Bang. (1977). Epistemology nndpsychology 
offunctions. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel. (Original work published 1967) 
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1974). The child’s construction ofquantities. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1941). 
Reese, H. W., & Schack, M. L. (1974). Comment on Brainerd’s criteria for cognitive struc- 
tures. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 67-69. 
Rescher, N. (1988). Rationa&. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1989). Output interference, generic resources, and cogni- 
tive development. Journal ofExperimental Child Psychology, 31, 42-46. 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1990). Fuzzy processing in transitivity development. An- 
nals of Operations Research, 23, 37-63. 
Roodin, M. L., & Gruen, G. E. (1970). The role of memory in making transitive judgments. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 10, 264-275. 
Russell, J. (1981). Children’s memory for the premises in a transitive measurement task 
assessed by elicited and spontaneous justifications. Journal of Experimental Child Psy- 
chology, 31, 300-309. 
Russell, J. (1987). Rule-following, mental models, and the developmental view. In M. Chap- 
man & R. A. Dixon (Eds.), Meaning and the growth of understanding (pp. 23-48). 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Scribner, S. (1977). Modes of thinking and ways of speaking: Culture and logic reconsid- 
ered. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason (Eds.), Thinking (pp. 482-500). Cam- 
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Seltman, M., & Seltman, P. (1985). Piaget’s logic. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Siegel, L. S. (1978). The relationship of language and thought in the preoperational child: A 
reconsideration of nonverbal alternatives to Piagetian tasks. In L. S. Siegel & C. J. 
Brainerd (Eds.), Alternatives to Piaget (pp. 43-67). New York: Academic Press. 
Trabasso, T. (1975). Representation, memory, and reasoning: How do we make transitive 
inferences? In A. D. Pick (Ed.), Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology (Vol. 9, 
pp. 135-172). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Trabasso, T. (1977). The role of memory as a system in making transitive inferences. In 
R. V. Kail & J. W. Hagen (Eds.), Perspectives on the development of memory and 
cognition (pp. 333-366). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
von Eye, A., & Brandtstadter, J. (1988). Evaluating developmental hypotheses using state- 
ment calculus and nonparametric statistics. In P. B. Baltes, D. Featherman, & R. M. 
Lemer (Eds.), Life-span development and behavior (Vol. 8, pp. 61-97). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Vygotsky, L. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work 
published 1934) 
Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. M. (1972). Psychology of reasoning. London: Batsford. 
Youniss, J., & Furth, H. (1973). Reasoning and Piaget. Nature, 244, 314-315. 
Zedah, L. A. (1975). Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning. Synrhese, 30, 407428. 
RECEIVED: August 1, 1989; REVISED: August 27, 1990. 
